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PANEL II: DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT
PROFESSOR KELLY: Professor Strauss.
PROFESSOR STRAUSS: Thanks very much. And I’m sure
with everyone else shares my appreciation for two such
thoughtful and extraordinarily rich and well informed papers.
If you listened carefully to the gracious introduction that I
got, you heard no particular evidence of acquaintance on my
part with the world of corporate law or financial regulation as
such. I’m an administrative lawyer. I’ve served in go vernment
for a while, but on the health and safety side. And sitting here
in some way reminds me uncomfortably of the one time I taught
a private law course at Columbia, which was contracts. On the
first day of class I remarked that they had, my students had
probably worked out that I was a public lawyer by experience,
but that really the basic moves and skills that we would be
practicing were common to all lawyering and maybe it would be
helpful to them to think of me as a football coach who this year
was also assigned to help the lacrosse team. This apparently
produced panic among my students and so far as I could tell
was the only thing I said during the semester that stuck in
their memory. Nonetheless, public lawyer, administrative lawyer that I am, and this shapes the perspectives and reactions
that I bring to these two fine papers.
And maybe the place to start is with Eliot Spitzer, who has
recurred again and again during today’s talks. And perhaps it’s
possible to see this in a slightly different way by looking at
Merrill Lynch as an example of the supermarket, of the integrated financial creation. That suffered, at least so it appeared
through the eyes of Eliot Spitzer, and I tend to see some merit
in it, suffered from some internal conflicts of interest that had
not been identified in the regulatory sphere. So maybe this is
emblematic of the problems presented to us by supermarkets,
but I wonder if it’s emblematic of the appropriateness of response through a single super regulator, or whether in fact the
availability of an Eliot Spitzer or an SRO or a Securities and
Exchange Commission, a variety of possible avenues of response
to which the at least potentially mischievous participant in the
supermarket will need to be responsive, of which it will need to
be aware isn't a significant safeguard on the part of us, the folks
who are subject to their power and possible market manipulation.
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Well, you’ll recognize in the comments a common feature of
American thinking about law and constitutional affairs which
sharply distinguishes us from our European colleagues, who
tend to look for single grand schemes that will bring all things
together beautifully in a coherent way. And we like to muddle.
And checks and balances, that’s an American theme and I suppose it’s in some respect my response to the papers is to say,
well, these are on the whole a good thing.
I have four principal areas of response, interrelated. One of
them I can deal with very briefly, because Roberta [Karmel]
said it so well, is the adventitious nature of the American developments.
The second, the challenges and possibilities of what I’ll call
cooperative federalism, but it extends past federalism to private
organizations like the SRO’s.
A third, and particularly important, I think, what I’ll call the
limitations of expertise as a premise for regulation. That is, the
need to be concerned with the nature of the regulator. My colleague Jack Coffee was not able to be with us today, but if you
looked at the original program you saw that he was going to
deliver a paper on the problem of agency capture. Well, the
problem of agency capture is a real problem, and if there’s only
one agency to capture it’s a much larger problem than it is if
there are twenty or thirty of them. That’s harder to do, albeit
that introduces as well some inefficiencies of a nature that’s
important to be aware of.
And finally, and related to that, the centrality of private interests to effective regulation.
So the adventitious nature of American developments.
American politics simply aren’t organized to produce rational
design, a precision mechanism of government reflecting exquisite and comprehensive rationality. And it starts with the fact
that we don’t have parliamentary democracy in this country.
And so members of Congress are free to go off on their own and
not subject to the discipline of an executive who thinks he or
she knows what it is he wants.
It seems to me not to have been an accident that the creation
of the unitary system of regulation in Great Britain was attended by a remarkable political change in that country, although, Claire [Kelly], you didn’t address it in quite that way.
Here legislative action is rarely the result of thoughtful and
comprehensive drafting, like the civil codes of Europe, but it
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tends to be a spontaneous response to the perceived urgencies of
the moment, developments in the nature of the market to developments in its size and the number of its firms, to economic
crises, to particular outbreaks of unscrupulous or at least unacceptably hazardous behavior. And the resulting crazy quilt of
institutions that can't be given a rational or scientific explanation. Its parts grew out of the crises, needs and changes of previous times and they stay with us until new crises, needs and
changes cause us to adjust them.
And I noticed in this respect, that in talking about the possibilities of a comprehensive regulator, there’s been this strange
possible participant that’s appeared and disappeared at var ious
times during the course of the day.
We’ve tended to talk about banking, insurance and securities.
Every now and then the CFTC and what it regulates has reared
its head and then it’s disappeared again. Commodities aren’t
on the general map that we’ve been talking about today, but I
thought we heard enough about commodities this morning, and
particularly about those things that people could pretend were
commodities, manipulate into regulation by commodities regulators instead of securities regulators, to think that that too is a
necessary part of the theoretical structure.
Well, I have to say that, in a similar way, it seems to me that
Europe’s issues and institutions are and will be precisely the
product of becoming Europe, of having to accommodate to new
realities of markets and the information age. The old jealousies, languages, preferences, legal systems, governmental styles,
and expectations and habits of Europe. And it’s a lot tougher,
with twenty languages and governments that have been in
place for two or three centuries or longer, than it has proved to
be — much longer — than it has proved to be here, I would
suppose.
We’ve been talking about Europe and the United States, but I
suppose it’s also hard to imagine in a globalizing economy that
these developments are going to stop with Europe. As the nature of markets and market participation change, law and institutions are going to follow, because they have to. And so tomorrow this conference will be talking about some global regulator
of the securities markets.
But the institutions and professional alignments and e xpectations will grow up around whatever arrangements we make, as
they have around the arrangements we’ve already made, and
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then became stuck. Not rational, necessarily, but not unworkable, either. And so we live with them until they’re proved inadequate.
So the challenges and possibilities of cooperative federalism.
Europe, as I now understand it, faces the imperatives that
drove the expansion of our federal government’s activity during
the New Deal, when the Securities and Exchange Commission
was born. There is now a European economy. It didn’t used to
exist in the way in which it does today. It has needs that can't
be safely entrusted to individual states that might be too easily
tempted into efforts to favor their own citizens, that could produce a race to the bottom or, worse, war, economic or real. It
certainly has done that in the past, in the history of that continent.
So I think we have to expect European institutions to emerge.
But what will be the character of their political control in a
Europe that still lacks for itself genuine democracy? That’s an
issue that we haven't heard talked about really at all today, the
nature of the political controls over these institutions, either
within the nation or, perhaps more importantly, within Europe,
itself. How can we expect these institutions to interact with the
still empowered state institutions, each in this case acting under unique conditions of language, political history and go vernme ntal institution?
I think among the lessons of the American experience is that
ideas like subsidiarity, however powerful they may be intellectually, will not inevitably constrain the growth of central institutions. Thomas Jefferson, in a corresponding situation long
ago characterized the reasoning possible under the equivalent
American principle as the house of cards, as house of cards reason. You can just build on it until you get to the point of intellectual collapse, I suppose.
As the economy of Europe becomes more and more interdependent, what individual states can effectively accomplish, each
within the limits of its own jurisdiction, will become more and
more subject to rational question. And the destruction of such
arguments by experience was almost precisely the experience
that we had during the Great Depression of the 1930’s that
brought central federal regulation of the financial markets.
So then the thing to see, it seems to me, is that the federalist
argument doesn’t just produce regulation here or there, but one
has the SEC operating in cooperation with the SRO’s, with pri-

File: PANEL II Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 4/2/2003 7:17 PM

PANEL II TRANSCRIPT

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:32 AM

555

vate regulators who must also in some respects cooperate with
state authorities in many federal regulatory programs — if not
the SEC, state regulators in turn operate under the supervision
of federal as well as state authorities. And that’s what we hear
about as being in the future of Europe, subject to the loss of
their powers, or some of them, if they don’t satisfy their federal
overseers that they are satisfactorily carrying out their responsibilities.
Politically, I suppose, having national authorities carry out
European policies under supervision — one way to understand
the elegant charts of Professor Di Giorgio’s and Dr. Di Noia’s
paper is both politically and legally attractive. It appears to
retain national power and it subdues possible questions of legality and authority for the imposition of legal sanctions. But
when they’re thought to be national departures from the European norm, when the question is sanctions against those national authorities or perhaps the suspension of their responsibilities in favor of direct European action, which are the things
that can happen in this federal system, then the difficulties indeed may be substantial. No one looking at the contortions that
our Supreme Court is now going through over the relations between the state and federal authority, even under a system as
long established and as firmly grounded as our own, could possibly think otherwise.
So then the limitations of expertise as a premise for regulation. Both papers, again, and perhaps especially the Di GiorgioDi Noia paper, are written from a perspective of confidence in
what I might call virtuous objectified expert regulation. This is
the unseen quality of Professor Schooner’s superheroes this
morning. It was not just that they were men of steel or superb
detectives. It’s also that they were rigorously honest, and they
always acted on the public’s behalf. Do we have that kind of
confidence about all of our regulators all of the time? And what
mechanisms do we have in place to secure their honesty, their
responsibility, their political accountability?
It’s striking, in a way, that the agencies we’ve been talking
about at the federal level are all so-called independent regulatory commissions. That is to say, they’re at some remove from
the President, maybe a little vulnerable to the Congress. The
chairman of one of the IRC’s once remarked that being the chair
of an independent regulatory commission meant that you had to
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appear naked in front of the 535 members of the United States
Congress.
Maybe they’re a little bit vulnerable to the Congress, but
we’ve set them up with the idea that they ought to be outside
politics. No one has solved the constitutional question of how
we can have the Federal Reserve in relationship to the Constitution that we have, given the extraordinary independence that
it’s had. We’ve been rather lucky. But what does the fact of
these, I’ll say for the moment, three independent regulators —
the SEC, the CFTC and the Fed — suggest for the possibilities
of a committee of coordination?
We have a committee of coordination. It’s called the President, right? And what Congress has deliberately done for its
own reasons, which one can find explained in political history —
Alexander Hamilton argued rather strongly for this — we have
to separate the money supply from politics — is to put these
regulators at the farthest remove possible within the framework of our constitutional structure from the committee of coordination. And whatever that impulse is, shouldn’t we expect it
also to work and to trouble the possibi lities of coordination in
this context?
Capture is seen as corruption or failure — and it sometimes
is — and not as the product of legislative choice — as it also
sometimes is — or political change — as it equally may be. The
general admi nistrative law scholarship has at least moderated,
if it hasn’t entirely abandoned, its faith in expertise for visions
that attempt more room for politics as a desirable, honest, inevitable element of government. And we need to think about
how that can be achieved in these areas.
So a consequence, then, seems to me is to bring into prominence questions about the transparency of regulatory decisionmaking, about expansive participation in regulatory decisionmaking, about political controls over its outcome, that so far
today I really haven't heard addressed. But it seems to me if
we’re engaging in discussions about institutional design, in
matters as important to us as the monetary supply or the stability of our financial markets, we ought to be thinking about it.
It’s particularly important in respect of policy making, rule
making, in the American jargon.
In the past, Europeans have been content to treat policymaking simply as an output of parliamentary government and
not be very concerned about how it happened. It’s changing a
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little bit, and I should think gratifyingly. The American approach is very different. Particularly as policy-making moves
out of the hands of ministries who can be controlled by a vote of
no confidence in the parliament, it warrants a good deal of attention.
If independent regulatory commissions offer no assurance of
pure expertise, one rule maker for all financial institutions
would diminish further the claim to expertise and raise further
the needs for mechanisms to assure consensus and transparency. So when we’re thinking about how we want regulatory
regimes constructed, I think it behooves us to think rather aggressively about the controls and politics that will operate on
them and in them, not only in the first flush of enthusiasm for
their mission, but also over the longer term.
I mean, you may know the story of the creation of the first
American independent regulatory commission, the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The railroads were at first alarmed
because this had come about out of basically a populist upswell
in response to the inability of the states to control the price
gouging by the railroads. The Attorney General took the president of some railroad aside and said, don’t worry abo ut it.
You’ll live with this for five or ten years and then it will be
yours. And he was, of course, right.
The failures of many agencies can, I think, be ascribed to the
absence of such thinking. The great American scholar, Louis
Jaffe, in a wonderfully titled piece he wrote near the end of his
long career, The Myth of the Ideal Administration, remarked on
his conviction that we get about as much regulation as our political leaders are convinced we’re going to effectively demand.
Keeping the conditions of public awareness necessary for effective political demand is a challenging task. And I expect it will
be a particularly challenging task in Europe.
So, finally, the centrality of private interests, of the many
voices to effective regulation. Both papers do express a concern
with the problem of capture, which can be a problem. Yet, depending on how we look at it, it might also be a strength, or
even a precondition.
One of the things about having any number of agencies is
that different participants in the regulatory framework may
tend to be served by different agencies among the groups that
are there. Certainly Professor Di Giorgio and Dr. Di Noia
might be right, that one risk of a single unitary regulator is that
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it might more easily succumb to the subversion of collusive relationships with the intended object. And regulatory competition
has the possible virtue of avoiding this problem at the cost of
the inefficiencies that Professor Jackson suggested this morning. But I do think it’s worth paying attention to all those
groups that are interested in the nature and extent of regulation as well as the bureaucrats and politicians, themselves, and
acknowledging that they have different ends and views, that
they’re competing.
So among those that come to mind in respect of the regulatory schemes we’ve been talking about today are individual investors, institutional investors like pension funds, investment
professionals, like the folks at, I’ll say Merrill Lynch, but they’re
more than a brokerage house these days, banks, insurance
companies, entrenched corporate management — we haven't
heard so much talk about them, but they’re in many respects
the real objects of regulation, whether they’re interested in securing capital or maintaining power — politicians, that is to
say, legislators and executive officials, members of the entrenched civil service, who have their own axes to grind and
their own strong sense of how their activities serve the public
interest.
And we might also think here about the implications of those
private recoveries and the defense fee. The defendants in those
cases have to pay their lawyers in order to keep the price as low
as $4 million. So it must be higher than that. The implication
of all of this for the regulated.
Real problems for rationalization. But it really is harder to
capture the SEC and Eliot Spitzer than it would be to capture
the SEC or Eliot Spitzer alone. So these are perhaps also elements of the complex systems by which we hope to keep scoundrels in their holes and public confidence in our financial markets high. Thanks a lot.
PROFESSOR KELLY: I’d like to give the presenters a
chance to perhaps respond and then we have some time for
questions from the floor.
PROFESSOR DI GIORGIO: Just a quick comment to the
very interesting points that you raised. Of course, yes, what
you said about the political control is what we call the accountability. You want to have independent but accountable age ncies, and this is an important problem that probably deserves
one or more p apers.

File: PANEL II Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 4/2/2003 7:17 PM

PANEL II TRANSCRIPT

Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:32 AM

559

It is already a big issue in the European Monetary Union, because . . . we have delegated monetary policy to the European
Central Bank, which is a fantastic institution, technically well
equipped, and has all the instruments to reach its targets. But
the problem is that it also sets the targets. So usually you don’t
want to have a central bank which is politically completely independent, because inflation rate is a tax and in democracies
taxes are usually selected by the parliament.
So this is alread y a problem in Europe and we have to deal
with this probl em also in the context of financial market regulation.
PROFESSOR STRAUSS: It’s a tax only on creditors.
DR. Di NOIA: Another quick point. Also you raised the que stion if we can trust — I mean, the . . . honesty of these regulators. I hope — I’m coming from a regulator, so I think we can
trust them. Probably we cannot trust their ability to regulate
and to supervise. So the real problem is, at least for the Italian
institutions in this period in the last years, is that they really
are . . . lacking expertise. And in a sense they are — many people like me go away, go in the market. But there is not a tradition of the other way back.
So in a sense they’re not specializing enough. This morning it
was pointed out in order to supervise derivatives you need
really in financial innovation, you need people that really know
the market and specialized people. And probably this is what
the institution, even the European institutions, still lack. And
this is, I think one of the biggest problems.
PROFESSOR STRAUSS: Who will watch the watchers is in
some respect the defining question of American constitutional
law.
DR. Di NOIA: This is off the topic.
PROFESSOR DE GIORGIO: For this you should provide a
good mechanism to have incentives for good regulation. But
you cannot just trust the regulator. That I agree.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: I would say only that I think the issue of accountability is indeed a very important issue. And it’s
probably because Americans don’t trust power, whether it’s in
the private sector or in government, that we have such a tremendously chaotic system of regulation. Because I think there
is a fear that if a single regulator gets too much power, that
power will be abused and that there will be insufficient accountability.
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And at the federal level, our system of accountability primarily is Congressional oversight committees. And watching that
process over the course of much of my career, I would say it’s
not very inspiring. And it doesn’t give one a sense that it would
be a good idea to have too much power in a single agency that
has accountability only to some Congressional oversight committee.
PROFESSOR KELLY: I know it’s late in the day. We have
time, though, for a couple of questions from the floor.
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: I just want to make it clear
that Batman is a vigilante [laughter]. I actually had a question
for Professor Di Giorgio about your comments on the Bundes
Bank. I wonder if in Europe, in the Euro area countries —
those few countries where the bank supervisor is at the central
bank which is no longer central — whether that fact might be
an impediment to a working proposal. Are those banks going to
be reluctant to give up what little task — the one thing that
they still have is really a formal role in supervisory, since they
no longer make monetary policy. I’m just curious what you
think about that.
PROFESSOR Di GIORGIO: Of course they are reluctant.
And they also have another powerful instrument, which is the
European Central Bank General Council. The governing body,
is made up of twelve national governors and six central ones.
And so the weight of the decision is in the periphery and not in
the center of the body.
Actually, there is a paper that before Carmi ne mentioned of
the European Central Bank, in which there is big support for
the important role of central banks in banking supervision, although the trend in Europe is totally the opposite.
PROFESSOR STRAUSS: Is it possible to remark that that
scheme, like our Fed, I think, is institutionalized capture? That
is to say, it is the banking business that is essentially in control
of the banking regulator.
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: This is for Professor Karmel. Would you comment in terms of the federal/state dynamic
in the securities area that perhaps the state role is really one
maybe of accountability to the SEC. When you look through the
history, that the states brought the issue of the penny stocks
and the blank check line pools, and you had the 1990 Act, they
brought to the attention — and there were federal rules then
with r espect to those, Rule 419.
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Then you had the states bring the issue of the microcap fraud
and federal rules on that. Online trading, day trading, and
even as late as Sarbanes-Oxley, we now have in federal law that
state enforcement actions, certain state enforcement actions
now become the statutory disqualification under the ’34 [Securities Exchange] Act for certain brokers and associated persons.
So I’m thinking in terms of not so much state and federal in
regulatory competition, in the sense of competing against each
other, but more or less an accountability, and when something
is brought to the federal government’s attention through state
actions, whether they be studies done by the states or whether
they be actions by attorneys general such as Eliot Spitzer, that
the federal government then, for national problems, should address it and then the states kind of recede. And that’s really
kind of our accountability.
PROFESSOR KARMEL: You could look at it that way.
I think another way to look at it is that it has something to do
with this problem of capture.
The SEC is focused on the markets and on the securities industry, on capital formation, and to some extent institutional
investors. Whereas the states think of securities regulation
more as consumer protection, that they’re more focused on protecting individual investors who believe they’ve been ripped off
by some fraud in the market.
So I think it’s in part this difference in focus that gets the
states very excited about some kinds of frauds that you wonder,
well, why didn’t the SEC ever focus on this. Because that’s not
what they’re looking at most of the time.
And, yes, you can look at it as an accountability, but I don’t
think the purpose of the states acting is really to make the SEC
more accountable. It’s to protect the residents within their
state that they feel need some protection.
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: In terms of this accountability concept, I know the French have a delict that sounds in
the Americanese as the failure of a supervisor, a public supervisor to do its job.
I think the House of Lords has twice in recent years been
seized of the question of whether community law sets up such a
tort against the Bank of England. They said no, but it has refused in a separate decision, summary judgment, what we call
summary judgment, when one makes out that the common law
should evolve to consider a tort of administrative neglect.
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Now, this, of course, would be startling news ove r here. But
does that have a controlling element in Europe? Is there such a
delict, tort, I have no idea of the Italian usage.
PROFESSOR FERRAN: In the U.K., at least, the FSA enjoys
immunity from claims for negligence, which I believe is sort of
common practice for banking regulators to have, and that’s been
extended to the FSA generally. But it doesn’t have immunity
from deliberate misfeasance. And that’s what the issue has
been in the cases you mentioned. It also doesn’t have immunity
for human rights violations, which is the European Convention
dimension. And it’s as yet unclear what exactly that will allow
in sort of challenges.
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE: [Unintelligible]
PROFESSOR FERRAN: Exactly.
DR. Di NOIA: Formally, Italy, at least, for example,
CONSOB [Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa],
but there is not a formal immunity. Some judges actually — I
mean, there are some cases not yet solved, and some people
tried to take CONSOB to court in cases of not having controlled
or supervised that well. But it’s not clear, and we are actually
curious, because there is no final decision in many of the cases,
because according to some people, when they sued CONSOB of
the administrative authority, and they want to pay a lot of
money.
On the other side, there’s an administrative authority, of
course, all the decisions of CONSOB go to the administrative
court there to separate decision. But of course they have no
direct input on, let’s say, private investors for the central bank.
And then also for the sanctions that are issued by CONSOB
or by the Bank of Italy against the, let’s say, banks or securities
firms, there is a sort of appeal. Formerly, the sanctions are
proposed by the bank or by CONSOB to the treasury. Then the
treasury issues a decree with a fine, let’s say. And you can also
go to appeal to court for that.
PROFESSOR KELLY: Any other questions?
Well, I think I’d like to take this opportunity to thank all of
our presenters today and our commentators. Also to thank our
hosts, the Center for the Study of International Business Law
and the Brooklyn Journal of International Law. In particular,
Professor Karmel and Professor Fanto for organizing this event.
Also Michelle Scotto and our symposium editor, Jessica Lubarsky, as well as the students of the Journal and the student fel-
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lows of the Center who worked here today. And we look forward
to seeing the papers and commentaries published in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law. Thank you.

